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Abstract
Background: It is widely accepted that the shift in case-fatality rate between waves during the 1918 influenza pandemic
was due to a genetic change in the virus. In animal models, the infectious dose of influenza A virus was associated to the
severity of disease which lead us to propose a new hypothesis. We propose that the increase in the case-fatality rate can be
explained by the dynamics of disease and by a dose-dependent response mediated by the number of simultaneous
contacts a susceptible person has with infectious ones.
Methods: We used a compartment model with seasonality, waning of immunity and a Holling type II function, to model
simultaneous contacts between a susceptible person and infectious ones. In the model, infected persons having mild or
severe illness depend both on the proportion of infectious persons in the population and on the level of simultaneous
contacts between a susceptible and infectious persons. We further allowed for a high or low rate of waning immunity and
volunteer isolation at different times of the epidemic.
Results: In all scenarios, case-fatality rate was low during the first wave (Spring) due to a decrease in the effective
reproduction number. The case-fatality rate in the second wave (Autumn) depended on the ratio between the number of
severe cases to the number of mild cases since, for each 1000 mild infections only 4 deaths occurred whereas for 1000
severe infections there were 20 deaths. A third wave (late Winter) was dependent on the rate for waning immunity or on the
introduction of new susceptible persons in the community. If a group of persons became voluntarily isolated and returned
to the community some days latter, new waves occurred. For a fixed number of infected persons the overall case-fatality
rate decreased as the number of waves increased. This is explained by the lower proportion of infectious individuals in each
wave that prevented an increase in the number of severe infections and thus of the case-fatality rate.
Conclusion: The increase on the proportion of infectious persons as a proxy for the increase of the infectious dose a
susceptible person is exposed, as the epidemic develops, can explain the shift in case-fatality rate between waves during
the 1918 influenza pandemic.
Citation: Paulo AC, Correia-Neves M, Domingos T, Murta AG, Pedrosa J (2010) Influenza Infectious Dose May Explain the High Mortality of the Second and Third
Wave of 1918–1919 Influenza Pandemic. PLoS ONE 5(7): e11655. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011655
Editor: Robert Belshaw, University of Oxford, United Kingdom
Received January 27, 2010; Accepted June 7, 2010; Published July 26, 2010
Copyright:  2010 Paulo et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: TD acknowledges the support of the Faculdade de Cieˆncias e Tecnologia through grant PPCDT/AMB/55701/2004. The funders had no role in the study
design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: cristinapaulo@ecsaude.uminho.pt
Introduction
During the 20th century there were three influenza pandemics
[1,2] characterised by the occurrence, within one year of, at least,
two to three successive epidemic waves and by an increase in the
case-fatality rate in the later waves [3,4]. The 1918 influenza
pandemic caused up to 40 million deaths [1,5,6], a number that
far exceeded the number of fatalities in the 1957 and 1968
influenza pandemics, of about 2 and 1 million deaths, respectively
[7–9]. The reasons behind the exceptionally high case-fatality rate
in the 1918 influenza pandemic have been associated to the virus
pathogenesis [10–12], the absence of antibiotics to treat secondary
bacteremia infections [13,14] and to a debilitated health care
system, exhausted by a frail population found at the end of World
War I [3]. The increase in the case-fatality rate between waves, on
the other hand, is attributed to the emergence of a pathogenic
virus type after a genetic change in the circulating virus [10] or to
a reassortment with a zoonotic influenza virus [15–17]. The
precise time at which the new virus type emerged is not known and
at least two hypothesis have been proposed [1]. Some authors
advocate that the virus emerged immediately before the Autumn
wave [15,18], whereas others proposed that the virus had seeded
itself earlier in 1916 [19,20]. Supporting the latter hypothesis is the
small time interval of six months between the first and second
wave for the new virus to spread worldwide, and the increase in
the number of deaths from influenza-like illness in military camps
and in small civilian communities during the winters of 1916 and
1917 [21]. Furthermore, the rate of evolution of the neurami-
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nidase and hemagglutinin genes, whose coded proteins are
determinant in the entry and exit of the virus in the host cell,
suggest a possible emergence in 1915–1916 [19]. The protracted
period of almost two years, between seeding of the virus and the
emergence of the 1918 influenza pandemic, was explained by the
restricted travel during World War I which allowed the virus to
maintain itself in small civilian communities and in army camps
while increasing in virulence [20,21]. Later on, demobilisation of
troops would have aided the spread of the virus worldwide [20].
However, this may not be the reason for the shift in disease
severity, given that demobilisation started after the armistice
signed in November 11th, that is, after the deadly second wave
had peak in most European countries [3] and in many USA cities
[22].
In this paper we explore a new hypothesis for the pattern of
increased case-fatality rate during the latest waves of the 1918
influenza pandemic. This hypothesis is based on a dose-dependent
response according to which influenza mortality increased when
healthy susceptible persons were exposed to a high infectious dose
of the 1918 influenza virus. The possibility of a dose-dependent
response to explain the increased case-fatality rate during the
second wave of the 1918 influenza pandemic has never been put
forward. This is particularly surprising given the observation, in
the laboratory setting, that only inoculation with a median
infectious lethal dose, that is the dose that kill 50% of the animals
inoculated, in mice [10,11] and in cynomolgus macaque model
[12], caused extensive oedema and haemorrhagic exudates as
reported for patients who succumbed to the 1918 influenza
pandemic [12].
In this paper we used mathematical modelling to simulate the
dynamics of influenza virus infection in an immunological naı¨ve
population, from invasion of the virus until one year later. To
model the infectious dose we assumed that, in average, the dose is
mediated by the number of simultaneous contacts a susceptible
person has with infectious ones. We further distinguished between
mild and severe disease by assuming a lower or a higher mortality
rate, respectively.
Results
Simulations from the proposed model showed a two-wave
pattern and an increase on the case-fatality rate (CFR) during the
second wave (Figure 1). This increase results from an increase in
the incidence of severe cases that build up as the proportion of
infectious persons in the population increases. The CFR for severe
disease is 5 times higher then the CFR for mild disease, such that
an increase of 1000 mild cases add to mortality 4 deaths whereas
1000 severe cases add to mortality 20 deaths. The increase in the
Figure 1. Incidence, mortality and case-fatality rate for influenza pandemic under different levels of multiple contacts between a
susceptible person and infectious ones. A and B gives the mortality rate and the case-fatality rate for scenarios 1 (k~2) and 2 (k~8). C and D
gives the corresponding incidence per 100 000 persons in the population and the effective reproduction rate.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011655.g001
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CFR is also higher when the parameter that measures simulta-
neous contacts is higher, k~8 (Figure 1B). During the second
wave there is a distinct mortality rate that depends on the
infectious dose, here mediated by the number of simultaneous
contacts, whereas for the first wave the mortality in both scenarios
is almost the same (Figure 1). The first epidemic wave peaked in
July, when the effective reproduction number (R) is already
decreasing below 1 due to a very low value of the transmission rate
(b(t)) (Figure 1C and 1D). That is, in July the transmission is no
longer effective even though there are plenty of susceptible
persons. As such, the proportion of infectious persons that build up
is not enough to generate many severe cases and the CFR is then
maintained near 0.4% during the first wave in both scenarios
(Figure 1A and 1B). During the second wave, on the other hand, R
is higher than 1 and the epidemic build up quickly. The second
wave peaked in October and the mortality rate is then dependent
on the value for simultaneous multiple contacts between a
susceptible and infectious persons (k).
If the number of simultaneous contacts is decreased from k~8
to k~2 in the middle of the epidemic, there is a decrease in the
mortality rate observed (Figure 2A). The total mortality rate
among the population when k~8 was 4267 deaths per 100 000
persons whereas when k decreased to 2 the total mortality rate
decreased to 3773 deaths per 100 000 persons. Decrease in
mortality is higher when the change in k is implemented sooner in
the epidemic and has no impact if it is implemented too late.
In the proposed model a third wave can occur as persons in the
recovery compartment wane immunity. Nonetheless, the rate at
which immunity is lost has to be high, in the order of 1 year in
average (Figure 2B). If the rate is low (table 1), there are only two
waves (Figure 2), unless there is introduction of new susceptible
persons in the population (Figure 3). If a group of persons became
voluntarily isolated, for instance due to the perception of a high
number of deaths, returning to the community some days later,
several epidemic waves occurred. The number of epidemic waves
will depend on the time of the epidemic people leave and return to
the community. The lower the value of mortality that alert people
leave the community, the higher the number of waves (Figure 3A
and 3C). The CFR depends on the proportion of infectious
persons in each wave and on k. But, for the same transmission rate
and population size, the more waves are build up the lower the
chance a susceptible person has to make simultaneous contacts
with infectious persons in each of the waves and lower the CFR.
This is depicted in the simulations. The total number of deaths for
k~2 without isolation, was 2984 deaths per 100 000 persons
(Figure 1A), whereas with voluntary isolation there were 2947
Figure 2. Dynamics of influenza pandemic with varying k and waning immunity. A a change in the level of multiple contacts as soon as the
number of deaths is above 500 from k~8 to k~2 and B a faster rate for waning immunity in a scenario where k~2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011655.g002
Table 1. Parameters used in the model.
Parameter Value Reference
R0 Basic reproduction rate 2–5 [50,60]
1=n Average period in latent compartment (days) 2 [41]
1=t Average period in infectious compartment (days) 5 [41]
ri Rate of waning immunity (days) 9.7e-04 (mild), 4.8e-04 (severe) [51–53]
k Level of multiple contacts 2 and 8
v Proportion leaving the susceptible compartment 0.1
d Proportion returning to the susceptible compartment 0.1
b0 7e{08
b1 5e
{08
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011655.t001
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deaths per 100 000 persons (Figure 3A). If people become isolated
at different times during the epidemic, more waves were produced
and less deaths occurred. In the scenario producing four waves
there were 2884 deaths per 100 000 persons (Figure 3C).
Discussion
In this paper we proposed that severe cases resulting from an
infection with influenza A virus of a naı¨ve healthy individual is due
to a higher infectious dose of the virus. Additionally, we proposed
that the infectious dose is mediated by the number of simultaneous
contacts established between a susceptible person and infectious
ones. In this sense over-crowded places would have been ideal for
a susceptible person to be exposed to very high infectious doses of
influenza A virus. In 1918 the army camps fit the model by being
characterised by a high number of contacts between people and by
a high case-fatality rate, sometimes 5 to 8 times higher than the
case-fatality rate among civilian communities [23,24]. This
difference in influenza-like illness mortality is sometimes associated
to poor conditions in military base hospitals [23] or to a lower lung
capacity of soldiers due to the inhalation of gases during the war
[20]. However, of note, many of these reports were from training
army camps [24] where soldiers had health-care conditions similar
to those offered to civilian communities. Differences in the CFR
could also result from age related mortality since persons aged
between 20–30 years old, similar to the soldiers age range, were
the most severely affected during the 1918 influenza pandemic
whereas among civilians the CFR might have be muted due to a
wider age range. Nonetheless, even between civilian communities,
factors such as crowding or continuous exposure, that can be
viewed as favouring simultaneous contacts between a susceptible
person and infectious ones, were associated to higher mortality
rates. Rurality, for instance, was referred as a protective factor for
the 1918 influenza pandemic mortality compared to urban areas
[25–27]. In one of these papers the CFR was estimated and it was
found that case-fatality rate was highest in larger towns followed
by smaller towns and cities. Villages appeared to yield the lowest
case fatality with an estimated 0.96 (0.82 1.09)% and the highest
morbidity [27]. This may be indicative that the chance to make
simultaneous contacts between a susceptible person and infectious
ones is higher in larger cities compared to villages. In villages,
contacts are probably easily established between persons, enhanc-
ing transmission, but most probably involve, at each time, few
infectious persons which diminishes k and thus the CFR. We
cannot, nonetheless, exclude other factors for the observed
difference. Socio-demographic heterogeneity’s such as a higher
proportion of young people, poorer health and nutrition in urban
areas may have also contribute to the difference in mortality
between urban and rural areas [27]. More examples that could be
indicative of a higher mortality associated to a higher infectious
Figure 3. Dynamics of influenza pandemic with volunteer isolation. A and B volunteer isolation started when the number of deaths was
above 400 and persons returned to community when the number of deaths was bellow 100 and C and D volunteer isolation started when the
number of deaths was above 200 and persons returned to community when the number of deaths was bellow 100. Arrows in B and D indicate the
time at which persons leave and return to the susceptible compartment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011655.g003
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dose include data from two parishes in Norway, where the number
of rooms per apartment was associated to a higher mortality
during the 1918 influenza pandemic [28], as well as an analysis of
mortality data by family in Iceland, that lead the author [29] to
propose that the most important determinant of fatal outcome
during the 1918 pandemic was associated to greater proximity or
repeated exposure to infectious patients, possibly through greater
infective dose of the virus, resulting in higher viral burden with
‘‘cytokine storm’’ and death. As in previous examples other factors
such as economic level that could determine the nutrition status
and access to health care services among persons living in smaller
and crowding apartments cannot be excluded [30].
It is generally recognised that there is a minimum infectious
dose able to produce infection in naturally occurring influenza in
humans. The importance of this dose-dependence is the basis for
some of the World Health Organisation recommendations for
pandemic influenza interventions. Those interventions are aimed
to reduce contacts with infectious individuals avoiding infection of
other persons or delaying the spread of the virus and thus prevent
disruption of health-care services [31]. The effect of high infectious
dose on influenza disease progression, on the other hand, have
been shown in experimental animal models [32–39]. The dose-
dependence is variable, depending on the site of inoculation [35],
the host background [40], the host age [38] and the influenza virus
type. Overall, a high infectious dose is associated to a higher viral
load [33,34], with a smaller period of time to maximum viral load
[33,34] and with extensive clinical symptoms [32,34,39]. In
volunteer challenge studies using humans, only the duration of
virus shedding was found to be dose-dependent on the intranasal
dose whereas the number of symptoms were more dependent on
virus shedding [41]. Challenge studies in humans are difficult and
results can be confounded by attenuation of the virus, the route of
infection and previously acquired immunity [41]. Furthermore,
volunteer challenge studies lead to mild or symptomless disease
only and may not reflect naturally acquired influenza virus
infection characterised by a spectrum of disease states, ranging
from clinically symptomless illness through mild infection and to
severe, even lethal, viral pneumonia. Ethical limitations in
volunteer challenge studies are overcome by the use of
mathematical models to reproduce the dynamics of the immune
response against an infection with influenza A virus in humans. A
robust result from simulations of these models point to an upper
threshold on the infectious dose above which the proportion of
damaged epithelial cells results in severe influenza disease [42,43].
For a small infectious dose the disease progresses through an
asymptomatic course and for intermediate values of infectious
doses the outcome is variable [42] which could, in part, explain the
lack of a clear dose-response in human studies.
In our model we assumed that the number of simultaneous
contacts between a susceptible person and infectious ones is a
proxy for influenza infectious dose. Influenza A virus spreads from
person-to-person by droplet transmission [44], aerosol transmis-
sion [45] or self-inoculation by contact with fomites or
contaminated hands [44,46]. Both droplet transmission and
transmission through contaminated hands needs close contact
between susceptible and infectious persons and, although long-
range transmission of aerosol particles is possible, the amount of
virus sprayed in each sneeze is so small and is so rapidly diluted, as
the aerosol disperses, that the risk of infection is probably
significant only at the proximity of a susceptible person [44,45].
In our model we also addressed waning immunity as a possible
mechanism to explain a third wave. This mechanism has been
previously used to fit a dynamical model to data on the 1918
influenza pandemic and the best fit estimated that the replenish of
the susceptible pool due to waning immunity could occur in a time
scale from weeks to months [47]. This rate is higher than the one we
used in the model but in fact the only difference expected by
increasing the rate of waning immunity is a higher morbidity during
the third wave and thus a higher CFR, but still lower then the CFR
during the second wave. An important aspect not covered by this
modelling is the inclusion of asymptomatic cases [47]. If the
infectious dose is very low we expect more asymptomatic infectious
individuals [42] that in turn will decrease the attack rate, decreasing
the number of infectious individuals and thus of severe cases.
Overall, nonetheless, the model reproduces the mechanism we
want to show. In fact, according to the model structure case-
fatality rate is a non-linear function of the number of infectious
individuals, increasing at a higher rate when severe disease cases
build-up. This structure differs from other mathematical models
[48,49] where case-fatality rate is a linear function of the number
of infectious persons. This difference has important consequences
when interpreting historical data on mortality and when
considering strategies to mitigate influenza mortality. Case-fatality
rate associated to the 1918 influenza pandemic has been estimated
as being between 0.3% and 6% [23,50]. Under this hypothesis,
nonetheless, the CFR associated to severe disease has to be much
higher than 6% to have in average an observed CFR of 6%. Also,
as simulations showed, the number of severe cases, in each wave,
decreased when the number of infections was spread along time,
which resulted in a decrease of the overall CFR. Adoption of
layered non-pharmaceutical interventions, like school closure and
public gathering ban, earlier and in a sustained way, have been
considered to reduce the attack rate of influenza among persons in
the community [31]. However, as simulated by mathematical
models, the efficacy of these interventions are greatly dependent
on the basic reproduction rate (R0) and on the starting time and
duration of those interventions [48,49]. In light of our hypothesis,
nonetheless, non-pharmaceutical measures may be more impor-
tant to reduce case-fatality rates than morbidity. Implementation
of such interventions spreads the epidemic into a longer period,
decreasing the number of infectious persons at each time in the
epidemic, and consequently decreasing the number of severe
influenza cases among healthy people and overall mortality.
Materials and Methods
Transmission model
To illustrate this hypothesis we used a compartment model to study
the spread of the influenza virus in a completely immunological naı¨ve
population, from invasion to one year later. (Figure 4). At the start of
the simulations all individuals are susceptible to infection (S). After
infection, susceptible individuals become exposed (E) for 2 days
before becoming infectious (I). The infectious period (I) lasts for 5 days
(Table 1) and is followed by the recovery state (R) characterised by
resistance to re-infection by an homotypic strain. There are two
compartments for exposed, infectious and recovery states corre-
sponding to mild and severe disease. In the model, both disease states
are differentiated by the case-fatality rate and by the decay in the
antibody titre. In human studies it was observed that after primary
infection, antibody titre against an homotypic type decreased with
time and three years after maximum antibody response antibody titre
was not found in between 11 and 34% of previously infected
individuals [51–53]. This observation is in agreement with earlier
animal experiments were it was observed that the immune response
of ferrets following influenza infection, with low or high infectious
doses, was resistant to re-infection [32]. Instead, the decay in antibody
titre was accelerated for lower infectious doses [32]. Accordingly, in
the model, recovery from mild and severe infection was followed by
Pandemic Influenza Mortality
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an exponential rate of decay in antibody titre in a way that,
respectively, at the end of one or three years, 70% of individuals are
still resistant to infection (table 1). The compartmental model is
formalised by the following system of ordinary differential equations:
dS
dt
~m{l(t)S{mS{A(tD)SzB(tD)Hzr1R1zr2R2 ð1Þ
dH
dt
~A(tD)S{B(tD)H{mH ð2Þ
dE1
dt
~l(t) (1{w(t))S{nE1{mE1 ð3Þ
dI1
dt
~nE1{tI1{d1 I1{mI1 ð4Þ
dR1
dt
~tI1{mR1{r1R1 ð5Þ
dE2
dt
~l(t) w(t)S{nE2{mE2 ð6Þ
dI2
dt
~nE2{tI2{d2 I2{mI2 ð7Þ
dR2
dt
~tI2{mR2{r2R2 ð8Þ
where m corresponds to the birth and death rate of hosts. The full
parameter set is described in table 1. The infection rate l(t) is given
by l(t)~b(t) ½I1(t)zI2(t). Voluntary isolation, that is the transfer
of susceptible persons from S to H depend on the function A(tD) and
B(tD) given by;
A(tD)~
v if tDwt0
0 otherwise

B(tD)~
d if tDvt1
0 otherwise

where D gives the total number of deaths at time t.
We used BerKeley Madonna v8.3.12 with autostepsise method
to find the numerical results of the model. Initial conditions for
the system are given by S(0)~9999950, I1(0)~50 and
H(0)~E1(0)~L2(0)~I2(0)~R1(0)~R2(0)~0. The total popu-
lation size is N~1000000.
Simultaneous contacts
We assumed there is a minimum dose of virus necessary to
cause severe infection, and bellow that dose the disease is mild.
Severe disease is characterised by a case-fatality rate d2~2%
whereas mild disease is characterised by a case-fatality rate of
d1~0:4%.
To model the aggregation of infectious individuals around
susceptible persons we used a saturating function of the Holling
type II function [54] that is used in population dynamics to model
the ability of preys to escape the predator. The Holling type II
function is given by
q(t)~
I1(t)zI2(t)
N
=
1
k
z

I1(t)zI2(t)
N

The function w(t) becomes saturated for sufficient large proportion
of infectious individuals which was interpreted by a limit in the
number of social contacts a susceptible person can established,
simultaneously, with infectious persons. This social limit is given
by k= (1zk). The reason to use this function is as follows. The
standard infection rate, b(t)I1(t)zI2(t)S(t), used in epidemiolog-
ical models, is based on the law of mass action and determines that
pairs of individuals interact through chance encounters. This law is
only valid for low ‘‘concentrations’’ (e.g., in chemistry, dilute
solutions), where simultaneous interactions of three or more
individuals have negligible probability. In the context of this work,
the relevant interaction of multiple individuals is the simultaneous
interaction of a susceptible individual with n infectious individuals.
This is a subset of the pair-wise interactions (i.e., some of the pair-
wise interactions are also (nz1) wise interactions). For values of k
near zero, the social limit is so constrained that there are no
interactions of more that two individuals and, even when the
number of infectious individuals is very large, all interactions are
just pair-wise and there are no severe cases of influenza. At the
opposite extreme, when k is very large, there is no limit on these
interactions, and so, when almost all individuals in the population
are infectious, almost all susceptible individuals develop severe
influenza.
Seasonality
Influenza virus activity displays pronounced seasonal cycles in
temperate areas with a peak in incidence during winter months.
Such seasonal behaviour has been associated with temperature
Figure 4. Compartment model for influenza. Each compartment
correspond to a class of individuals in the population and arrows
indicates transfer of individuals (table 1). In summary S stands for
susceptible, E for exposed, I for infectious and R for recovery. The
subscript 1 and 2 stands for mild and severe disease. The transfer of
individuals from S to H is always 0 except for two scenarios where we
assumed that persons after perceiving a higher number of deaths leave
the community and become voluntarily isolated. Details on the model
are given in the Methods.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011655.g004
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and humidity [55–57], to changes in mixing patterns like school
terms [57,58], increased viral production under winter conditions
[59] or simply driven by resonance caused by under-detected and
small seasonal changes in transmission [59]. We introduced
seasonality into the model by assuming that virus transmissibility
varies periodically with an yearly cycle. To this end, we modelled
the contact rate with a sinusoidal function
b(t)~b0zb1 sin
2p(t{170)
365
 
where, the two parameters b0 and b1 represent the baseline rate of
transmission and the amplitude of seasonality, respectively. The
function b(t) has period of 365 days. Simulations start at 1st May
(t~0) and transmission has a maximum value 260 days after, in
1st January and a minimum value, 75 days after, in 1st July. The
values for the b(t) parameters were adjusted such that the
seasonally-varying basic reproductive number over an annual
cycle summed to
Ð 365
0
R0(t)~3 with an amplitude in the range
between 1 and 5 [50,60,61]. The transmission rate was then scaled
according to
R0(t)~
b(t)nN
(mzn)(mzd1zt)
for this model structure the effective reproduction number R, that
is the number of cases an infectious individual can generate in a
non-susceptible population is given by the R~R0S=N .
Methodological overview
We modelled two scenarios (Figure 2) corresponding to two
different values of the parameter k~2 and k~8, that is the
number of simultaneous contacts between a susceptible and
infectious persons. A third scenario was simulated by decreasing
the value of k as soon as the total number of deaths increases
above 200 (Figure 3A) and a fourth and fifth scenario by allowing
voluntary isolation and return to community at two different times
in the epidemic (Figure 4). In the fourth scenario persons left the
community when the total number of deaths was higher then 200
(t0w200) and return when the number of deaths was bellow 100
(t1v100), and in the fifth scenario persons left the community
when the total number of deaths was above 400 (t0w400) and
return when the total number of deaths was bellow 100. The last
scenario was simulated by allowing a faster decay in antibody titre
(Figure 3B). For severe disease antibody decay was set to 1=r2~2
years and for mild disease to 1=r1~1 years. Incidence was
estimated as the number of infectious persons per 100 000
persons, mortality rate was estimated by the number of deaths
by 100 000 persons and case-fatality rate (CFR) was estimated as
the proportion of deaths among infectious persons.
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